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COMMENTS
TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS: DISCRETION AND
DISCRIMINATION
Among the many powers of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) is the ability to exempt certain organizations from the burden
of taxation. Although the Internal Revenue Code identifies general
categories of exempt institutions, the Department of the Treasury
has broad discretion to interpret statutory language with precise
regulations that the IRS then applies in individual cases. This
Comment examines one such regulation, as applied in a particular
case, in an attempt to highlight the need for greater control of the
executive bureaucrats' discretion.
In Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States,' the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia upheld an IRS deter-
mination that a nonprofit publishing organization could be denied
tax-exempt status on the ground that its newspaper failed to offer
"a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts as to
permit an individual or the public to form an independent opinion
or conclusion." 2 This Comment questions the practicality and
constitutionality of a regulatory scheme that requires tax examiners
to judge a publication's content. After presenting the facts of the
case and the intricacies of the Treasury regulations, the Comment
will focus on specific regulatory problems: how should the regu-
lations be interpreted?; which tests apply to what organizations?
Considerable unclarity and latitude for subjectivity are evident in
the IRS scheme. The following sections deal with the constitutional
limits on the IRS's power to withhold exemptions and conclude
that first amendment and equal protection doctrines prohibit re-
liance on the reasoning approved in Big Mama Rag. More specif-
ically, the broad language of the regulation and the conflicts be-
tween its various provisions create a serious possibility of unfair
administration and chilling effect. The Comment concludes with
a suggestion for salvaging the present regulations.
179-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 19362 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No.
79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
2 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3) (1959). This standard is applied to
groups that advocate a particular view but claim exemption as educational
organizations. The "full and fair" standard is discussed at length below, see
notes 64-73 infra & accompanying text.
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I. THE CASE AND THE TREASURY REGULATIONS
In 1974, Big Mama Rag, Inc. (BMR, Inc.), a women's organiza-
tion that publishes a feminist newspaper, applied for tax-exempt
status as a charitable and educational institution.3 Such applications
are governed by section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code,
which grants exempt status to a variety of socially useful organiza-
tions, including the "charitable" and the "educational." 4 To
qualify, an applicant organization must conform to Treasury regu-
lations that define the activities and goals permissible for exempt
institutions. In broad outline, the regulations allow exempt status
to applicants whose articles of organization restrict their activities
to furtherance of exempt purposes (the "organizational test"),5 or
whose activities are, in fact, primarily directed to accomplishment
of exempt purposes (the "operational test").0 An applicant fails to
meet these tests if any part of its net earnings inures to the benefit
of private persons. 7 The regulations also forbid exemption of
"'action' organizations," 8 those which "attempt to influence legis-
3 Brief of Appellant at 8, Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, No. 79-1826
(D.C. Cir., docketed Aug. 1, 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief of Appellant].
Tax-exempt status is not valuable to Big Mama Rag, Inc. and similar nonprofit
organizations because it allows them to escape income tax-they have little or no
income. Rather, exempt status is desirable because it makes these organizations
attractive to contributors. Under I.R.C. § 170(c)(2), charitable donations may be
deducted from the donor's taxable income if, and only if, the donee is a tax-exempt
institution. For further discussion, see text accompanying note 148 infra.
4 LR.C. § 501(c) (3). The section reads, in pertinent part:
(c) LIST OF EXEMPT ORGANazATioNs.-The following organizations
are referred to in subsection (a) [which grants exemption]:
(3) Corporations, and any community chest, fund, or foundation,
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific.
testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes, or to foster
national or international amateur sports competition (but only if no
part of its activities involve the provision of athletic facilities or
equipment), or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals, no
part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or invidual, no substantial part of the activities of which
is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation, (except as otherwise provided in subsection (h)), and
which does not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing
or distributing of statements), any political campaign on behalf of
any candidate for public office.
For a general discussion of statutory administration, see Rainey & Henshaw,
Exempt Organizations: A Survey, 19 S. TEx. LJ. 205 (1978).
5 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (1959).
6Id. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c).
7 I.R.C. § 501(c) (3). For complete text, see note 4 supra. See Treas. Beg.
§1.501(c)(3)-1(b) (2) (1959) (repeating statutory prohibition of private
inurement).
8 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(3) (1959).
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lation" 9 or "participate in, or intervene in . . . any political
campaign on behalf of any candidate for public office." 10 The
Treasury regulations go on to define some of the exempt purposes
specified in section 501(c)(3), including "charitable" 11 and "edu-
cational." 12 The dangers inherent in these definitions form the
subject matter of this Comment.
Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States 's illustrates the defini-
tional problems. Plaintiff is a nonprofit Colorado corporation with
a feminist orientation.14 The group offers a free library, lectures,
workshops, and seminars on women's issues, but its primary activity
is the publication of Big Mama Rag.15 This monthly newspaper
prints news reports, information, and editorials from an avowedly
feminist point of view.16 Most of the staff volunteer their services; ".
moreover, BMR, Inc. distributes free a large percentage of Big
Mama Rag's issues and severely restricts the amount of paid ad-
vertising.' Consequently, the organization neither makes nor ex-
pects to make a profit; 19 it is heavily dependent upon charitable
contributions.
2 0
The IRS District Director first denied BMR exempt status on
the ground that the sale of some of its issues in the general market
made the group's activities indistinguishable from ordinary com-
mercial practices.21 When the organization filed a protest, a hearing
was held at the IRS national office. There, new reasons were given
9I.R.C. §501(c)(3). The regulations prohibit exemption if attempts to
influence legislation form "a substantial part" of the organization's activities, Treas.
Beg. § 1.501(c)(3)-I(c)(3)(ii) (1959), or if the organization's main objectives
can be attained only by passage or defeat of legislation and the organization
"advocates or campaigns for" its objectives in partisan fashion, id. § 1.501(c)(3)-
1(c) (3)(iv).
1OI.R.C. § 501(c) (3). The regulations specify written and oral statements
favoring or opposing a candidate as examples of participation or intervention.
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iii) (1959).
1Treas. Beg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
'2Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3) (1959).
1379-1 U.S. Tax Gas. 7f9362 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No.
79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
'4 Id. 86,869.
15 Id.
16 Id. "The editorial stance of the newspaper is that it will print anything that
will advance the cause of the women's movement; it refuses to publish material it
considers damaging to that cause. Big Mama Rag, Vol. 1, No. 3, at 2, CoL 2.."
17Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 7f9362, at 86,870
(D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
lai d.
19 Id.
20 Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 7.
21 See id. 9 (quoting District Director's letter of Oct. 17, 1974).
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for denial of exempt status: the commercial nature of the newspaper,
its political and legislative commentary, and the articles and other
materials "promoting lesbianism." 22 At the hearing, IRS officials
offered the opinion that, according to an "unwritten policy" of the
IRS, depiction of homosexuality as a valid sexual preference was
impermissible for a tax-exempt organization.23 After BMR, Inc.
indicated that it would seek judicial review of the determination,
the IRS issued a final determination letter, basing denial on yet
another set of grounds: BMR, Inc.'s regular commercial practices
and Big Mama Rag's lack of educational content.24
BMR, Inc. secured judicial review in federal district court.m
In a memorandum decision, 26 Judge John Sirica upheld the IRS
determination. He first rejected the contention that plaintiff's pub-
lishing practices were indistinguishable from ordinary profitmaking
ventures.27 His decision rested solely on the definition of "educa-
tional": Big Mama Rag had "adopted a stance so doctrinaire it
could not satisfy this standard." 28
The specific standard that Big Mama Rag failed to meet is con-
tained in Treasury regulation section 1.501 (c)(3)-l(d) (3):
(3) Educational defined- . .
. . . An organization may be educational even though
it advocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it
presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the
pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to
form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other
hand, an organization is not educational if its principal
function is the mere presentation of unsupported
opinion.29
221d. 9-10.
231d. 10.
24 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9362, at
86,870 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
1, 1979).
25 See 26 U.S.C.A. § 7428 (Supp. 1979) (providing for declaratory judgment
in federal district court for determination of tax-exempt status).
26Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f 9362 (D.D.C.
Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
27 Id. 86,870.
28 Id. 86,872.
29 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-I(d)(3) (1959). Application of this test to
organizations claiming educational exemption on the basis of published material is
further governed by Rev. Rul. 67-4, 1967-1 C.B. 121, which lists the following
criteria:
(1) the content of the publication is educational, (2) the preparation of
material follows methods generally accepted as "educational" in character,
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BMR, Inc. argued that its activities could be judged not by
the rigorous "full and fair" test, but under the more generous
standard promulgated in Treasury regulation section 1.501(c)(3)-
I (d) (2): 30
Charitable defined. The term "charitable" is used in
... its generally accepted legal sense .... The fact that an
organization, in carrying out its primary purpose, advocates
social or civic changes or presents opinion on contro-
versial issues with the intention of molding public opinion
or creating public sentiment to an acceptance of its views
does not preclude such organization from qualifying under
section 501(c)(3) so long as it is not an "action" organiza-
tion .... 3 1
Although this section is entitled "Charitable defined," it appears
appropriate for educational organizations because the enumerated
charitable activities include "advancement of education." 32 Had
the court chosen to apply the charitable standard rather than the
specifically educational one, plaintiff would have escaped the need
(3) the distribution of the materials is necessary or valuable in achieving
the organization's educational and scientific purposes, and (4) the manner
in which the distribution is accomplished is distinguishable from ordinary
commercial publishing practices.
These criteria were promulgated to govern exemption decisions based on scientific
publications, but have since been extended to the field of education. See Rev. Rul.
77-4, 1977-1 C.B. 141.
Obviously, a publication must pass the first hurdle of "educational content"
before an analysis of publishing practices is undertaken. Because the revenue
ruling offers no new guidance on the meaning of "educational," this Comment will
focus on the definition in Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3) (1959).
3 0 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 7 9362, at
86,871 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1,
1979); Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Declaratory Judgment at 11 [hereinafter cited as Plaintiff's Motion in
district court].
BMR, Inc. also argued that Big Mama Rag fulfilled the requirements of the
"full and fair" standard. See Plaintiff's Motion in district court, supra at 14.
31 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959) begins:
(2) Charitable defined. The term "charitable" is used in section
501(c)(3) in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c) (3) of
other tax-exempt purposes which may fall within the broad outlines of
"charity" as developed by judicial decisions. Such term includes: Relief
of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged; advancement of
religion; advancement of education or science; erection or maintenance of
public buildings, monuments, or works; lessening of the burdens of Govern-
ment; and promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to
accomplish any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood
tensions; (ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend
human and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat community
deterioration and juvenile delinquency.
32 Id.
854 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
to demonstrate that Big Mama Rag offered "full and fair exposition
of the pertinent facts." An IRS examiner or a reviewing judge
would only have inquired whether the organization was primarily
concerned with advocating the election of particular political
candidates or the passage or defeat of legislation.33 Unlike the "full
and fair" standard, the test for charitable exemption does not
demand examination of the factual support for the idea advocated.
The trial judge declined to apply the more lenient standard.
3 4
Acknowledging the existence of "some semantic confusion," he
nevertheless relied on precedent 35 and on the simple fact that
separate definitions had been promulgated to hold the stringent
test appropriate to organizations whose only claim to charitable
exemption is their advancement of education.36 In applying the
"full and fair" standard to plaintiff, the court found that Big Mama
Rag's writers had not been "sufficiently dispassionate as to provide
its readers with the factual basis from which they may draw inde-
pendent conclusions." s7
Big Mama Rag, Inc. also argued that the first amendment
precluded the use of a content-based test for granting the prize of
tax-exempt status. This contention was rejected on the ground that
there is no "right" to tax exemption; it is a "privilege," which may
be withheld on any rational, nondiscriminatory basis.38  Judge
Sirica also determined that the "full and fair" standard was suffi-
ciently precise and value-free to withstand the charge of uncon-
stitutional vagueness.39
The district court in Big Mama Rag had jurisdiction under a
newly enacted declaratory judgment provision 40 adopted to provide
33 See notes 8-10 supra & accompanying text.
34Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1f 9362, at 86,872
(D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
35 Id. 86,871 n.5 (citing San Francisco Infant School v. Commissioner, 69 T.C.
957, 963-64 n.5 (1978)). The inappropriateness of this case is discussed in
note 95 infra.
36Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,871. The
court also remarked that an applicant organization that is "charitable" on some
ground other than "advancement of education" may benefit from the lenient
standard. Id. 86,871 n.5.
In failing to consider whether BMR, Inc. fit into the charitable category on non-
educational grounds, the court ignored plaintiff's argument that its goal could be
defined as "'the promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to . . .
eliminate prejudice and discrimination [or] defend human and civil rights secured
by law."' Plaintiff's Motion in district court, supra note 30, at 11 (quoting Treas.
Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959)).
97Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 86,872.
38 Id. 86,873.
89 Id.
40Tax Reform Act of 1976, § 1306(a), 26 U.S.C. § 7428 (Supp. 1979).
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rapid judicial review of section 501(c)(3) exemption controversies.
41
In recommending adoption of this provision, the Senate Committee
on Finance pointed to recent Supreme Court cases and to comments
by a former Internal Revenue Commissioner, all disparaging in
strong terms the absence of judicial control over IRS decisions.
4
Big Mama Rag ought to have been an example of the new regime
of judicial control; the court could have offered analytical guide-
lines for future IRS determinations. Instead, Judge Sirica ac-
cepted-almost uncritically-the broad language of the Treasury
regulation. His review of the parties' factual contentions rested
entirely on one article in one issue of Big Mama Rag.43 His only
advice for future review of allegedly educational publications was
that they must not be "doctrinaire." 44 As a result of this decision,
the "full and fair" regulation remains a source of potential
inequity.
4 5
The next part of this Comment examines the weaknesses of
the charitable/educational exemption regulation to show just how
amenable to unauthorized policymaking the tax law can be.
II. INTERNAL DEFECTS OF THE TREAsuRY REGULATION
The regulation at issue in Big Mama Rag contains two forms
of weakness. One stems from the broad language of the subsection
"Education defined." The other is the presence of conflict between
that subsection of the regulation and the one entitled "Charitable
defined."
A. The Problem of Vague Language and Subjective
Interpretation
(3) Educational defined-(i) In general. The term
"educational", as used in section 501(c)(3), relates to-
41 SENATE Comm. O-N FiNANCE, TAX RFxOEm AcT OF 1976, S. REP. No. 938,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 586-87 (1976).
42 Id. 586 & nn.4 & 5 (citing Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S.
752, 774-75 (1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416
U.S. 725, 749-50 (1974) ("The degree of bureaucratic control . . . is susceptible to
abuse."); Thrower, IRS Is Considering Far Reaching Changes in Ruling on Exempt
Status, 34 J. TAX. 168 (1971) (expressing need for more case law to guide IRS)).
4 3 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Case. 7" 9362, at
86,871 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1,
1979) (discussing Big Mama Rag editorial refusing to publish material that "does
not affirm our [feminist] struggle").
44 Id. 86,872.
4 5 Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974)
<Blackmun, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 200 infra.
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(a) The instruction or training of the individual
for the purpose of improving or developing his cap-
abilities; or
(b) The instruction of the public on subjects
useful to the individual and beneficial to the com-
munity.
An organization may be educational even though it ad-
vocates a particular position or viewpoint so long as it
presents a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the
pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to
form an independent opinion or conclusion. On the other
hand, an organization is not educational if its principal
function is the mere presentation of unsupported opinion.
46
The language italicized above instructs the tax examiner to make
three difficult and highly subjective assessments of educational
material: (1) its value ("useful and beneficial"); (2) its tenor ("ad-
vocates a particular position"); and (3) the quality of its argumenta-
tion ("full and fair" versus "unsupported opinion"). Each of these
elements of the definition of "educational" leaves improper room
for the influence of IRS agents' personal and political philosophies.
The wording in subsection (b), "instruction of the public on
subjects useful to the individual and beneficial to the community,"
provides a singularly convenient excuse for denying exempt status
to proponents of unpopular views. In the case of Big Mama Rag,
for example, the government argued that "a newspaper dedicated
to revolution and the destruction of societal institutions . . . can
hardly be viewed as instructing the public on subjects useful to the
community." 47 Judge Sirica did note that if this judgment had
been the sole ground for the IRS decision, reversal would have been
46 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959) (emphasis supplied).
47 Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 10, Big Mama Rag,
Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. fi 9362 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979). The brief quotes a lengthy
editorial in which the editors of Big Mama Rag explain their policies:
(1) We define ourselves as radical feminists. By "radical" we mean
that we are committed to the complete eradication of the present social
system, and the institution of another which will speak to the needs of
all people and which will not benefit any person or class of people at the
expense of any other person or class of people.
Id. 9 (quoting Big Mama Rag, Sept., 1976, at 4, col. 2). Judged on the basis of
this editorial, the governments characterization of Big Mama Rag as revolutionary
appears accurate. The characterization of this policy as not "beneficial to the
community" ignores, however, BMR, Inc.'s express intention to create an egalitarian
society and highlights both the importance and the subjectivity of the IRS judgment
required by the Treasury regulation.
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required due to the standard's subjectivity.48 Because he accepted
the IRS's alternative grounds, however, the denial and the regula-
tion were allowed to stand.49
The continued existence of this part of the regulation does not
become harmless even if Judge Sirica's treatment of it is approved
by other courts. The "beneficial to the community" standard lends
itself to such "unwritten policies" as the disapproval of proselytizing
homosexuality evinced by IRS officials at the Big Mama Rag
hearing.50 Although a denial of exempt status avowedly based on
this language could be struck down, the grant of an exemption based
on an "unwritten policy" along those lines might still be upheld. 1
In this regard, it is instructive to compare the treatment of
Big Mama Rag with the treatment of an organization that did clear
the "beneficial to the community" hurdle. Educational exemption
was granted to a group that gave counseling on unwanted preg-
nancies and provided information about lawful abortion, as well
as other options.52 Certainly the benefit to the community of such
counseling would be denied by many. Yet the IRS approved this
organization's application without analysis of the social bane or boon
of the education offered. By supplying federal support in the form
of a tax benefit, the Internal Revenue Service engages in social
engineering as surely as it does by denying that benefit.
53
48Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas, f 9362, at 86,872
n.6 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
491d. Under current Supreme Court doctrine, Judge Sirica was probably
correct in his unstated assumption that a constitutionally acceptable reason for
denial of the exemption justified the denial even if unconstitutional considerations
were also present. See Mount Healthy Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287
(1977) (school board may justify firing teacher by showing that it would have taken
the same action absent disagreement with his publicly aired views); Arlington
Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270-71 n.21 (1977)
(dictum) (village may justify racially discriminatory decision if it shows that the
same decision would result absent "impermissible purpose").
50 See text accompanying note. 23 supra. It should be noted that the IRS has
not proved wholly intolerant of homosexuals. See Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B.
172 (exempt status granted group dedicated to educating the public about
homosexuality).
51 Indeed, it would be a rare case that would come before a court at all
because the exempt institution is most unlikely to challenge the favorable IRS
ruling. Occasionally, however, third parties have been granted standing to challenge
tax exemptions. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd
per curiam sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971) (parents of children
excluded by racially discriminatory school policy may challenge exempt status of
school).
52 Rev. Rul. 67-216, 1967-2 C.B. 180.
53 The "beneficial to the community" language gives the tax examiner discretion
not only in evaluating worth, but also in defining the relevant community. Educa-
tional exemption was granted, for example, to an organization "formed to develop
safety standards ... for the .. .operation of yachts and other small craft." Rev.
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Further latitude for subjective evaluation is afforded by the
proviso requiring special scrutiny of advocacy. Only an organization
that "advocates a particular position or viewpoint" must present a
"full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts"; 54 the merely "edu-
cational" group need not run the "full and fair" gauntlet. Where
is the line between education and advocacy? Are only those who
teach extreme views "advocates," or should the term include also
those who argue noncontroversial positions? The latter course
offers the best assurance of administrative fairness. The IRS, how-
ever, has chosen the former line. The Treasury Department's
Exempt Organizations Handbook,55 in attempting to elucidate the
exemption guidelines, adopts the term "controversial" as a synonym
for "advocates a particular position": "Organizations doing research
or educating the public on controversial public issues must stick to
the reasoned approach and avoid unsupported opinion." 5
Revenue rulings on the issue are relatively sparse. A survey of
section 501(c)(3) rulings of the past fifteen years reveals that few
organizations have been deemed advocates. To the contrary,
several rulings involve cases of organizations that clearly sought to
advance particular social views, but were not even considered
candidates for the "full and fair" test under the advocacy proviso.
Examples include an organization "formed to educate the public
on the need for international cooperation," 57 an organization that
"extensively publicized" a "proposed code for fair campaign prac-
tices," 58 and several groups with the goal of eliminating discrim-
ination.59 These organizations may be contrasted with others that
Rul. 68-164, 1968-2 C.B. 252. Revenue rulings like this one indicate that organiza-
tions may obtain exempt status although their educational offerings appeal only to
small communities. The difference, of course, between the boating group and
BMR, Inc. is that the former is politically innocuous, the latter decidedly not. It
seems likely that the beneficiaries of a radical organization's activities would have
greater difficulty qualifying as an appropriate "community."
5 4 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959) (emphasis supplied). For
the full text of this section, see text accompanying note 46 supra.
553 INT. REv. MANUAL-A.DMN. (CCH) pt. 7751.
5 Id. §345.(12), at 20,572 (Apr. 28, 1977). This section of the handbook
combines discussion of action organizations and of advocacy. The first involves deter-
mination of whether the applicant organization advocates legislative action or
participates in specific political campaigns; the second, determination of the existence
of advocacy in organizations that do not fall within the "action- prohibition. The
sentence quoted in the text comes from the latter discussion.
57 Rev. Rul. 67-342, 1967-2 C.B. 187.
58 Rev. Rul. 76-456, 1976-2 C.B. 151. Analysis in this ruling was limited to a
determination that the organization did not run afoul of the prohibition on action
organizations, see notes 8-10 supra & accompanying text, by intervening in political
campaigns.
59 See Rev. Rul. 75-285, 1975-2 C.B. 203 (exemption of group that educated
minorities on legal rights and assisted in enforcement proceedings); Rev. Rul.
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were held to the advocacy standard. In the latter category were an
organization that sought to educate the public on homosexuality,60
a group dedicated to "alert the American citizenry to the dangers
of an extreme political doctrine," 61 and various nonprofit umbrella
organizations that provided forums for opinion on "controversial"
issues.
62
The real difference between the two sets of groups was not the
advocacy vel non of their particular viewpoints, but the nature of
those views. The rule seems to be that if the opinion is "innocuous"
or in keeping with prevailing mores, then it is education and not
advocacy; if the view is controversial, then the advocacy proviso
and the higher level of content scrutiny apply.
This evidence does not suggest that exempt status will be
denied for all controversial points of view.63 It does indicate,
however, that an organization whose views are nonmajoritarian is
more likely to be cast as an "advocate" and required to negotiate
the stumbling block of the "full and fair" standard. Because no
definition of advocacy is value-free, the decision to apply the strict
standard may rest upon a subjective evaluation of an organization's
public stance. As was the case with the "useful and beneficial"
clause, the advocacy proviso permits a tax examiner to follow his
own-or the majority's-social philosophy in reviewing applications
for tax-exempt status.
72-228, 1972-1 C.B. 148, 149 (exemption of organization that aided women in
"recognizing and dealing with discrimination"); Rev. Rul. 68-70, 1968-1 C.B. 248
(exemption of group seeking to eliminate employment discrimination); Rev. Ru].
67-250, 1967-2 C.B. 182 (exemption of organization that urged public to respond
to need for nondiscriminatory housing). These groups were also eligible for
exempt status as charitable organizations seeking "to eliminate prejudice and dis-
crimination." Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959). The rulings cited
above are notable, however, for having found an independent educational basis
for exemption.
6ORev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (exemption granted). Although the
ruling notes that the organization does not "advocate" becoming homosexual, id. 173,
the careful analysis of sources and documentation in the material distributed to the
public by the organization indicates that the "full and fair" standard was applied.
61 Rev. Rul. 68-263, 1968-1 C.B. 256 (denied exemption for not offering full
support of charges leveled against named individuals).
62 See 3 NvT. REv. MAN UAL-ADmIN. (CCH) pt. 7751, § 345.(12), at 20,573
(Apr. 28, 1977) (citing Rev. Rul. 66-256, 1966-2 C.B. 210). See also Rev. Rul.
79-26, 1979-1 C.B. 196 (group formed to educate public on right of access to
media and to evaluate local broadcasters); Rev. Rul. 76-443, 1976-2 C.B. 149
(educational television programming organization); Rev. Rul. 71-395, 1971-2 C.B.
228 (group that provided classes of interest to the community, including "con-
troversial" courses). All of these organizations were held to have fulfilled the
"full and fair exposition" requirement and were granted exempt status.
6 The homosexual and media programming groups were declared tax-exempt.
See notes 60 & 62 supra & accompanying text.
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A different source of ill-informed and subjective rulings lies in
the requirement of "a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the
pertinent facts as to permit an individual or the public to form an
independent opinion or conclusion." 6 This standard has been
interpreted as an instruction to prefer organizations that adopt
certain modes of argumentation: research or scholarly inquiry,
including surveys and opinion polls; 65 objective factual analysis
rather than appeals to emotion; and avoidance of disparaging terms
or inflammatory language. 66 Thus, the test governs the form and
content of an advocacy organization's public expression.
The essential failing of the test as interpreted is its narrowness-
the criteria listed above are inappropriate for many topics and
inadequate as definitions of education. The enumerated factors
may serve to define the boundaries of a scholarly research project.
The American Sociological Association, for example, might properly
use these factors to determine which articles it will publish.
Sociological methods of "truthfinding" should not, however, be re-
garded as synonymous with "education." 67 Both in law and in
common parlance, education has been a concept broad enough to
encompass strong language and emotional appeals. Even so
formidably prosaic an authority as Black's Law Dictionary states
that "[e]ducation may be particularly directed to either the mental,
64 Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i) (1959). For full text, see text
accompanying note 46 supra.
6G See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 78-305, 1978-2 C.B. 172 (approving organization whose
statements were prepared and supported "through the use of opinion polls and
independently compiled statistical data from research groups and clinical
organizations").
66 See Defendants' Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 7, Big Mama Rag,
Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. f[ 9362 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal
docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979):
Factors which should be considered relevant in making a determina-
tion as to educational content are: the degree to which the organization's
viewpoint is supported by a relevant factual basis; the extent to which
the publication makes use of inflammatory and disparaging terms which
express conclusions based more on strong emotional feelings than objective
factual evaluations; whether the organization resorts to innuendo and
inference rather than forthright statement of the proposition being
advanced; and whether the organization places primary emphasis on the
dissemination of information rather than research or scholarly inquiry into
the subject matter with which it is concerned. See Rev. Rul. 68-263,
1968-1 C.B. 256.
67That statistics are easily manipulated highlights the difficulty of equating
them with "education." A poorly designed questionnaire, for example, can skew
data to obscure the true result of an opinion poll. See generally D. HtF-, How
To LIE WrTa STvAns-ncs (1954); H. LoEuanR & D. McTAvsIr, DEscamnTVE
STAnsTics FOR SocIOLoGIsTS ch. 3 (1974).
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moral, or physical powers and faculties, but in its broadest and
best sense it relates to them all." 68
The judicial view is similar. As one court has stated, "'[e]du-
cation' is an extremely broad concept, and Congress has not specif-
ically defined its meaning in a tax sense. We note that the judiciary
will liberally construe, and rightfully so, provisions giving tax
exemptions for charitable, religious, and educational purposes." e9
In another context, the Supreme Court, recognizing the com-
municative value of powerful speech, held that a word's emotional
impact is as important an element of its message as objective denota-
tion.70 Yet the IRS conception of educational merit restricts
exempt communications to dispassionate, academic discourse. So
dry an approach misconceives the nature of education. A scholar's
appeal to reason may educate, but so may the advocate's appeal to
emotion or intuition.
7 1
The subjectivity of this element of the Treasury regulation's
test appears when it is applied to organizations like BMR, Inc.
Big Mama Rag is a self-styled radical feminist publication whose
editorials and commentary often employ highly charged rhetoric.
7 2
An Internal Revenue agent may well be ill-qualified to judge the
ability of the average reader of Big Mama Rag to "form an inde-
pendent opinion or conclusion" based on its articles. It is probably
safe to assume that many IRS officials-and even federal judges-
are not well versed in radical feminist ideology or comparably
controversial views. An examining official untutored in the niceties
of radical dialectic may easily regard its exponents as unremittingly
"doctrinaire," whereas a receptive reader would find reasoned de-
bate.73 Here again, as with the other two important elements of
68BLAces LAW DicTiONAnY 461 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of "education).
69 American Inst. for Econ. Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934, 937
(Ct Cl. 1962) (sustaining denial of exemption when organization's commercial pursuit
was substantial).
7 0 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971).
71 By itself, such a broad concept might include nearly every form of ex-
pression. Advertising could be called educational, as could "hate literature." It
need not follow, however, that all organizations whose publications are arguably
educational should hold tax-exempt status. Exemption is conditioned on other
requirements that this Comment does not question. The Treasury regulation
restricts the extent and form of commercial activities in which an exempt organiza-
tion may engage and prohibits private inurement and specific political activities.
See text accompanying notes 4-10 supra. An advertising or trade publication that
claimed to be educational would have to pass the noncommercial-activities test,
-which, given the natural purpose of advertising, is unlikely.
72 See note 16 supra.
73 Such insensitivity appears in the government's assessment of Big Mama Rag's
content. As evidence of the publication's insistent promotion of "its own unalloyed
point of view," defendants' appellate brief cites, among other examples, a reader's
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the Treasury regulation's definition of "educational," a majoritarian
mentality may condition the distribution of the tax benefit.
B. The Problem of Conflicting Subsections
The second major flaw in the Treasury regulation has already
been mentioned; it arises from the competition between the sub-
sections entitled "Charitable defined" and "Educational defined." 74
Both appear applicable to educational organizations because the
definition of charitable includes "advancement of education." 7r
The choice of definition, however, is more than an administrative
formality. Advocacy organizations denominated "charitable" need
not conform to the "full and fair" standard, while those labeled
"educational" must pass that test.7 6  For BMR, Inc., Judge Sirica's
selection of the educational standard resulted in denial of exempt
status; it probably would have qualified had the definition of "char-
itable" governed the decision.7 The following discussion attempts
letter that "attempts to explain some subtle distinctions between the philosophies
of two spokespersons for the 'revolutionary struggle."' Brief for Appellees at 14
& n.7, Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir., docketed
Aug. 1, 1979). Thus, one man's dogma may be another person's debate. This
episode is not offered as proof that BMR, Inc. should pass the "full and fair" test,
but it does illustrate the extreme subjectivity of the judgment called for under the
Treasury regulation.
Profitable comparison may be made to an observation on the dynamics of
prior restraint:
Perhaps the most significant feature of systems of prior restraint is that
they contain within themselves forces which drive irresistibly toward
unintelligent, overzealous, and usually absurd administration. One factor
is the ability and personality of the licenser or censor. As Milton long ago
observed,
"If he be of such worth as behoves him, there cannot be a more
tedious and unpleasing journey-work, a greater loss of time levied upon
his head, than to be made the perpetual reader of unchosen books or
pamphlets .... "
... The function of the censor is -to censor .... He is often acutely
responsive to interests which demand suppression-interests which he
himself represents-and not so well attuned to the more scattered and
less aggressive forces which support free expression.
Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAw & Co¢miMp. Paons. 648, 658-59
(1955) (footnotes omitted).
74 See notes 29-33 supra & accompanying text.
75Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
76 Id. ("charitable" organizations' public expression limited only by requirement
that they refrain from specified political activities that would render them non-
exempt "action organizations).
77 judge Sirica's opinion rested solely on the plaintiff's failure to conform to
the "full and fair" standard. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra. Because
the defendants did not allege that BMR, Inc. was an action organization, there
would have been no impediment to the grant of exempt status under the charitable
standard.
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to show that the distinction between charitable and educational
organizations is unjustified and, under the present regulatory
scheme, incapable of neutral administration.
There is little evidence of a systematic legislative policy behind
section 501(c)(3)'s list of exempt organizations." Changes and addi-
tions to the list have been largely ad hoc, reflecting changing fashions
in charity or particular political events. 79 Although the statute
recites "educational" and "charitable" separately, 0 the legislative
history of the Internal Revenue Code affords no basis for disparate
treatment of these categories-the problem is simply not discussed.81
Commentators have suggested that the statutory distinction is "an
unnecessary bit of specification." 8
This lack of coherent legislative policy may explain the
Treasury regulation's schizophrenia. For while the regulation dis-
tinguishes charity and education for definitional purposes, its sub-
stantive discussion of charity leads rather to the conclusion that
"charitable" must subsume "educational."
Not only is advancement of education listed in the regulation
as one example of a charitable activity, but also the regulation
-remarks that "charitable is used in its generally accepted legal
sense." 83 In order to understand the impact of that comment, one
-must look to the law of trusts, where legal treatment of charities
has been most comprehensive.M Under the common law, trusts
for "the advancement of education" 85 and the "dissemination of
78 See B. HopxiNs, TAE LAw OF TAX EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 3 (3d ed. 1979);
Bittker & Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal Income
Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301-04 & 334 (1976) (noting that rationales for
charitable and educational exemptions are essentially the same). See generally
Trenerry, A Literary Pilgrins Progress Along Section 501(c)(3), 51 A.B.A.J. 252
(1965).
79 Recent provisions delineating the extent of political parties' exemption
possibilities, e.g., I.R.C. §527 (1975), are thought to have been stimulated by
the Watergate scandal. See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 78, at 328.
80 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), quoted in note 4 supra.
81 See, e.g., HousE WAys & MEANs Coma ., INTmwAr REvmuE CODE OF 1954,
H.R. RE'. No. 1337, 83d CoNG., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in (1954] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4017, 4077 (no explanation of particular exemptions); 50 CONG. REC.
1306 (1913) (remarks of Rep. Hill) (suggests that enumeration of kinds of exempt
institutions is insignificant because only nonprofit character is relevant to tax-
exemption purpose).
s2 Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 78, at 333.
83 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2) (1959). The continued relevance of this
view is indicated by a 1976 Revenue ruling holding that "[t]he term educational is
used in section 501(c)(3) of the Code in its general legal sense in the law of char-
ities and does not have a separate and distinct meaning from the term Charitable."
Rev. Rul. 76-366, 1976-2 C.B. 144, 144.
84 See A. Scorr, 4 TBE LAw OF TRUSTS §§ 348-377 (3d ed. 1967).
88 Id. § 370, at 2866.
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knowledge or beliefs through the publication or distribution of
books or pamphlets" have long been held charitable.8s
Generous reading of the law of charitable trusts has been the
norm.87 Trusts providing for dissemination of unpopular minor-
ities' views are therefore upheld."" Moreover, the New Jersey
Supreme Court confirmed as a charitable trust a bequest for the
publication and advancement of the testator's scientific ideas, ideas
which the lower court had found "'irrational, unintelligible and
of no scientific or other value.' "89 The supreme court nevertheless
held that "[e]ven where the opinion sought to be propagated is
'foolish or ... devoid of foundation,' the bequest is not necessarily
void as a charitable use." 90 This broad-minded attitude is by no
means foreign to the Internal Revenue Service. In one instance, it
conceded that "the promotion of social changes or objectives by
educational means is 'charitable.' "91
Against such a background of trust and tax law a rigid dis-
tinction between education and charity seems quite unjustified.
When the effect is to exclude an organization from exemption
solely on the ground that it fails to meet the definition of "educa-
tional," the distinction flies in the face of the regulation's injunction
that "charity" "is not to be construed as limited by the separate
enumeration in section 501(c)(3) of other tax-exempt purposes which
may fall within the broad outlines of 'charity' as developed by
judicial decisions." 92
86Id. 2871.
87 The only content-related judgment conditioning the designation of a charitable
trust was very similar to the "useful and beneficial" standard contained in Treas.
Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959) and regarded as too subjective by Judge
Sirica, Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 7 9362, at 86,872
n.6 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
In the context of charitable trusts, this standard has been very narrowly defined to
prohibit designation as charitable only of trusts for the propagation of illegal or
dangerous ideas. See A. ScoTT, supra note 84, at § 370, at 2871. One court has
held that the judgment whether an idea is beneficial to the community is to be
made by the grantor of the trust and not by the court. See Wilber v. Owens, 2
N.J. 167, 176, 65 A.2d 843, 847 (1949).
8 See, e.g., Leubuscher v. Commissioner, 54 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1932) (prop-
agation of socialist philosophy is educational for purposes of establishing charitable
trust); Estate of Connolly, 48 Cal. App. 3d 129, 121 Cal. Rptr. 325 (1975)
(bequest to agnostic group held charitable because educational); A. ScoTt, supra
note 84, at § 370, at 2875 (citing cases).
89 Wilber v. Owens, 2 N.J. 167, 171, 65 A.2d 843, 844 (1949) (quoting Wilber
v. Asbury Park Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 142 NJ. Eq. 99, 111, 59 A.2d 570, 578
(1948)).
90 Id. at 176, 65 A.2d at 847 (citation omitted).
91 Center on Corporate Responsibility v. Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863, 874 n.21
(D.D.C. 1973).
92 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2) (1959).
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Despite the custom-historical and contemporary-of regarding
"educational" as a subset of "charitable," the Treasury regulations
do, in fact, supply different exemption standards. Leaving aside
the problem of justifying the distinction, the regulation is open
to criticism for failure to indicate when either test is applicable.
In Big Mama Rag, Judge Sirica suggested a rule of choice: the
educational test should be used when educational endeavors are
the only basis for exemption; when the applicant organization also
pursues some other charitable goal, then the charitable standard is
appropriate.93 This rule, though plausible, bears no relation to
IRS practice as revealed in cases and revenue rulings, which gen-
erally observe, without analysis, that an exemption should be
granted on "charitable and educational" grounds.94 The'rule is not
even supported by the case cited as its source.95 Nor did the district
court follow its own rule, for it ignored BMR, Inc.'s claim to
charitable exemption as an organization promoting social welfare
and equality. 6 Absent a rule originating in the regulation or in
established practice, a reviewing official's discretion is the only
guideline for the choice of standard.
In summary, each important element of the Treasury regu-
lation's definition of "educational," as well as the decision whether
to apply that definition or the more lenient definition of "char-
9 3 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. ff 9362, at
86,871 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
1, 1979).
94 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 75-285, 1975-2 C.B. 203 (education on minority rights);
Rev. Rul. 72-228, 1972-1 C.B. 148 (promotion of women's rights); Rev. Rul. 68-438,
1968-2 C.B. 209 (lessening of racial and religious tensions). One treatise has noted
this frequent failure to consider whether an organization independently satisfies the
"educational" or "charitable" standard. P. TnxuscH & N. SucA .,m, TAx Exmia'x
CmnnAABLE ORGA.3ZATiOxS 82-83 (1979).
05 See Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 7f 9362, at
86,871 & n.5 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir.
Aug. 1, 1979). Judge Sirica's reliance on San Francisco Infant School, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 69 T.C. 957, 963-64 n.5 (1978), is misleading and misplaced. The
issue in the Infant School case was whether the plaintiff day care center met the
operational test for a § 501(c) (3) organization. See text accompanying note 6
supra. The footnote cited by Judge Sirica supports the argument that a
charitable/educational and an educational/educational organization (assuming there
is a meaningful distinction) must meet the same activities requirements for the
operational test. That is, the same percentage of activities must be devoted to
education. This ruling is reasonable because only one operational test is enunciated
in the regulations-in § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c). Two standards, however, govern per-
missible advocacy, one applicable to educational organizations and the other to
charitable groups. The Infant School opinion did not address this issue at all.
Judge Sirica's attempt to transfer that case's treatment of the operational test to the
conflicting standards of advocacy glosses over the problem of choosing between
the two.
96 See note 36 supra.
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itable," contains vast loopholes for the play of individual discretion.
And personal discretion is a peculiarly disturbing standard of
review. The potential for unfair treatment has already been dis-
cussed.97 That potential is far from speculative, for instances of
abuse of the exemption process are documented.9s A personal
discretion standard is particularly troublesome when discretion is
given to bureaucrats, whose expertise is financial, to determine the
nature and value of an educational endeavor.99 These officials may
not take the time to consider variety and innovation in education,
innovation which might be acceptable to those truly dedicated to
and knowledgeable about the educative process. Far from avoiding
the danger of tax-subsidized social controversy, the regulation thus
permits IRS agents to influence that controversy by making personal
choices among social philosophies.100 If we genuinely value wide-
ranging, robust public debate,' 0' we should be wary of a govern-
mental process that lends itself to intellectual and ideological
leveling.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE EDUCATIONAL STANDARD
The previous parts of this Comment outlined the internal de-
fects of Treasury regulation 1.501(c)(3)-defects which -revealed a
degree of vagueness and a potential for discriminatory application
that go beyond maladjusted bureaucracy. The next part of this
Comment argues that these defects render the regulation a mecha-
nism for control of expression that violates the first amendment
and the equal protection component of the fifth amendment's due
process clause.
97 See notes 47, 50-53, 55-56, & 72-73 supra & accompanying text.
98 See note 145 infra.
99 Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy:
A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HArrv. L. REv. 705, 729
(1970). Surrey notes that parallel problems exist at the budgetary and legislative
levels. Tax incentives for education, for example, are handled by congressional
finance committees, and not by the committee that would ordinarily handle programs
operated by the Department of Education. For further discussion, see Kirkwood &
Mundel, The Role of Tax Policy in Federal Support for Higher Education, LAw &
CoNTEmp. PxoBs., Autumn, 1975, at 117.
100"Nothing is more certain than death and taxes except man's desire to
avoid both. Nothing is more uncertain than a prediction of a field agent's inter-
pretation of the Internal Revenue Code." Jordan, Trends in Tax Exemption, in
TRENxs IN NONPRoFrr OnAoNzAnONs LAw 11, 12 (collected papers from Wake
Forest University Seminar; H. Oleck chairman 1977).
101 See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964);
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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A. The Constitutional Status of Tax Benefits
1. "Rights," "Privileges," and Constitutional Challenges
Does denial of tax-exempt status infringe free expression so
directly and severely as to evoke strict judicial scrutiny? The
district court in Big Mama Rag disposed of the plaintiff's first
amendment claim by classing tax-exempt status a "matter of legis-
lative grace," 102 which could be invalidated only if "the purpose
or effect of the refusal [of exempt status] is . . . to discriminate
against those with controversial views or beliefs." 103 The court
concluded that plaintiff had not shown that the regulation was
invalid on its face or that the IRS used the educational standard
to discriminate against disfavored organizations. 104 Examination
of this holding will reveal that it is too narrow a view of first
amendment rights in general and inappropriate to exemption
questions in particular.
Underlying Judge Sirica's analysis and similar tax-exemption
determinations 105 is the assumption that first amendment problems
arise only when governmental actions deny or penalize a "right"
as opposed to a "privilege." This dichotomy is both outmoded and
unrealistic.0 8 A large body of case law recognizes that conditions
imposed upon the distribution of governmental largesse-a "priv-
ilege"-may entail unacceptable danger to protected rights. 0 7
These cases do not require evidence of actual discrimination before
the constitutional inquiry takes place; they look instead for the
-0 2 Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S.' Tax Cas. f9362, at
86,872 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1,
1979).
103 Id.
104 Id. 86,873.
105 See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959); Haswell v. United
States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. CL. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975); Christian
Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 864 (1973). See notes 122-33 infra & accompanying text.
10 6 See generally O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions: Welfare Benefits with
Strings Attached, 54 CAL. L. Bxv. 443 (1966); Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARv. L. Ruv. 1439 (1968);
Willcox, Invasions of the First Amendment Through Conditioned Public Spending,
41 CoNm=.L L.Q. 12 (1955).
107 See, e.g., Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (requirement
that public employees contribute to union's political activities unconstitutionally
conditions employment on compulsory "expression," i.e., contribution); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) (employment of nonpolicymadng state officials may
not be conditioned on association with a political party); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398 (1963) (first amendment violated when condition on receipt of un-
employment compensation conflicts with applicant's religious duties); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (second-class mailing privileges may not be
conditioned on "acceptable" content of publications).
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possibility of the government's achieving indirectly what it may not
do directly. 08
Speiser v. Randall 109 is a classic example of the unconstitutional
condition doctrine and a case crucial to the arguments of such
plaintiffs as BMR, Inc. In Speiser, the Court invalidated a
California state tax program that conditioned eligibility for property
tax exemption upon the taxpayer's willingness to sign a loyalty
oath." 0  In addition to having certain procedural vices,,11  the
exemption requirement violated the first amendment by exacting
the promise to refrain from arguably protected speech in return for
a financial benefit." 2  The Court found that "the appellees are
plainly mistaken in their argument that because a tax exemption is
a 'privilege' or 'bounty,' its denial may not infringe speech." 111
Some recent cases recast the unconstitutional condition theme
in an equal protection mode. This analysis has led to invalidation
of programs that grant privileges to one class of applicants but deny
them to another group whose exercise of a constitutional right is
the only feature distinguishing them from successful applicants."
Such distinctions in the distribution of substantial privileges dis-
criminate against or "penalize" constitutional rights. Shapiro v.
Thompson :5 exemplifies this line of argument. There, the
Supreme Court struck down state statutes that denied welfare
assistance to families unable to meet the requirement of one year's
'
08 See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (finding that one-year
residency requirement for welfare was unconstitutional burden on right of interstate
travel even in the absence of a showing that any welfare recipient had actually
been deterred from travelling).
109357 U.S. 513 (1958).
110 Id. 518-19.
"' The California Supreme Court had limited the condition by construing the
loyalty oath narrowly so that signatories swore only to refrain from speech con-
stitutionally punishable as criminal syndicalism. On certiorari, the United States
Supreme Court rejected this attempt to make the program constitutional and found
it violative of due process because the taxpayer had the burden of proving non-
criminal speech in the event that the authorities denied his application for
exemption. Such a procedural burden favoring the government was invalidated
because it had the potential of penalizing or deterring legitimate speech. Id. 526.
112 Id. 518-19.
11 Id. 518.
"4 See, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974)
(one-year residence requirement for eligibility for county-funded medical care
creates "invidious classification" that penalizes right to travel); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972) (durational residence requirement for participation in state
elections discriminates against recent immigrants). But see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464 (1977) (state refusal to provide Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions-
although it did pay for expenses incident to childbirth-not unconstitutional penalty
on women's right to abortion because it does not remove the means of obtaining
abortions through private funds).
115 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
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residence within the state.116 The waiting period created "two
classes of needy resident families indistinguishable from each other
except that one is composed of residents who have resided a year
or more, and the second of residents who have resided less than a
year, in the jurisdiction." 117 Although the Constitution provides
no "right" to welfare, the Court found that denial of so necessary a
benefit "penalized" the free exercise of the constitutional right to
travel.118
These cases suggest the broad outlines of constitutional argu-
ments suitable to BMR, Inc.'s situation: (1) that the IRS uncon-
stitutionally conditions tax-exempt status on an applicant's con-
formity with content standards contained in the "full and fair
exposition" test; 119 and (2) that invidious discrimination results
from government support of noncontroversial publications at the
expense of more radical ones and from the latitude given individual
prejudice in making exemption decisions.1 20 The question remains
whether these arguments would be successful. The following dis-
cussion considers, first, the case law that suggests that constitutional
problems are not raised by denial of tax benefits and, second, the
contrary argument that legal and practical considerations favor
strict judicial scrutiny of the Treasury regulation's "educational"
standard.
2. The Antilobbying Tax Provisions
Speiser v. Randall had appeared to establish that tax-exempt
status may provide the basis for a constitutional claim.' 2 ' Less than
a year after Speiser, however, the Court decided Cammarano v.
United States' 22 and severely undercut its earlier broad holding.
In Cammarano, plaintiffs challenged interpretations of the then-
current Treasury regulations, which prohibited deduction as "ordi-
nary and necessary business expenses" of expenditures in connection
116 Id. 622.
1171 Id. 627.
118 Id. 634.
119 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 31-39.
1
2 0 Cf. id. 43-44 (problems of discriminatory application discussed in context
of vagueness argument). For discussion of potential of discriminatory application
of the various elements of Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3) (1959), see notes 47-101
supra & accompanying text.
121357 U.S. 513 (1958). Cf. Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146
(1946) (second-class mailing privilege as basis for constitutional concern);
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (tax on newspapers' ad-
vertising revenues is unconstitutional attempt to limit circulation).
122358 U.S. 498 (1959).
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with attempts to influence pending legislation.lns The Court upheld
these antilobbying decisions and curtly dismissed an argument that
such provisions unconstitutionally penalized legislatively oriented
speech: "Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because
they engage in constitutionally protected activities, but are simply
being required to pay for those activities entirely out of their own
pockets . . . ." -1 The exemption program invalidated in Speiser
was distinguished as an attempt to suppress "'dangerous ideas,'"
while the antilobbying provisions were "[n]ondiscriminatory" '1-
that is, applied alike to all forms of speech identifiable as lobbying
without regard to the content of the views expressed.
Since Cammarano, lower federal courts have adopted auto-
matically its approval of antilobbying tax provisions and have
ignored or distinguished Speiser.126  Even more disturbing than
this rigid reading of Cammarano's first amendment holding is the
use of that ruling to limit equal protection scutiny in the field of
taxation. In the most recent instance, Taxation with Repre-
sentation of Washington v. Blumenthal,'27 the District Court for the
District of Columbia refused to reconsider the validity of Cam-
marano in the face of changes in the tax law that permit lobbying
by some exempt groups-for example, veterans,'1 2  fraternal soci-
123See id. 499. I.R.C. § 162(e) was amended in 1962 to allow business
deductions for some lobbying; deductions are still not permitted for grass roots or
political campaign activities.
Compare the antilobbying provisions of current I.H.C. § 501(c) (3) as imple-
mented by Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(c) (3) (1959) (prohibiting exemption of
"action" organizations that attempt to influence legislative activities). See notes
8-10 supra & accompanying text.
124 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).
125 Id.
126 See Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1148 (Ct. Cl. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1107 (1975) (upholding I.R.C. § 170(c)(2), which denies deduction
for contributions to group doing substantial lobbying; Cammarano cited for hold-
ing that such denial does not encroach upon first amendment rights); Christian
Echoes Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 864 (1973) (revocation of I.R.C. §501(c)(3) exemption of religious
organization that engaged in substantial political lobbying upheld on the ground
that free speech not restrained because exemption is right, not privilege).
These cases are notable for a seeming reluctance to rest wholly on the simple
finding that antilobbying provisions do not infringe free speech. In Haswell, the
court held that discrimination between lobbying and nonlobbying groups was
justified also by a compelling state interest in ensuring that governmental support
is not used to sponsor legislative change. 500 F.2d at 1150. The Christian Echoes
court met the charge that revocation of plaintiff's exemption violated the free
exercise clause of the first amendment with the response that the first amendment
compelled denial of support for religious groups' political activities in order to
maintain separation of church and state. 470 F.2d at 856-57.
12779-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119185 (D.D.C. 1979).
128LR.C. §501(c)(19).
[Vol. 128:849
19801 TAX EXEMPTIONS FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 871
eies, 29 and chambers of commerce -30-but continue to prohibit
lobbying by exempt charitable organizations.-1 The court found
that Speiser's denunciation of discrimination was strictly limited to
programs "'aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas' "132 and
had no application to discrimination among different groups
undertaking the same kind of expression. 33
There has been considerable criticism of the courts' rigid
treatment of Cammarano and challenges to antilobbying provi-
sions. 13 4 Even assuming the correctness of this line of cases, sound
legal and practical reasons counsel against following the Big Mama
Rag court's adoption of their analysis in educational exemption
cases. First, Speiser v. Randall is still good precedent for striking
down standards, like the "full and fair exposition" test, with dis-
criminatory potential. Second, the importance of the exemption
to marginal political groups makes IRS discretion a weapon whose
power should be subject to constitutional control through strict
judicial scrutiny.1
Loyalty oath cases were peculiar to the McCarthy era, and
undeniably the Speiser Court of 1958 was particularly concerned
with laws aimed at muzzling suspected subversives. The cases de-
scribed above go too far, however, in limiting Speiser to the Cold
War context. Nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion restricts
its application to "dangerous ideas." That language is used, 36 but
it is part of a broad-based discussion of the impermissibility of
129 I.R.C. § 501(c) (8).
130 I.R.C. § 501(c) (6).
131 Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Blumenthal, 79-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. g[ 9185, at 86,301 (D.D.C. 1979).
132 Id. (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).
333 Taxation with Representation of Washington v. Blumenthal, 79-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. ff 9185, at 86,301 (D.D.C. 1979). Having rejected the argument that Speiser
prohibited discrimination among such groups, the court went on to hold that a
simple equal protection argument, shorn of support from Speiser, could not evoke
strict judicial scrutiny because, under Cammarano, no fundamental right was
affected by denial of tax-exempt status. Id. 86,301-02. Accord, Taxation with
Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1978) (denying similar
claims presented by organization related to Taxation with Representation of
Washington).
'34 See, e.g., Taxation with Representation v. United States, 585 F.2d 1219,
1224-25 (4th Cir. 1978) (Winter, J., concurring & dissenting); Clark, The Limitation
on Political Activities: A Discordant Note in the Law of Charities, 46 VA. L. REv.
439 (1960); Rainey & Henshaw, supra note 4, at 230; Note, Political Activity and
Tax Exempt Organizations Before and After the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 38 GEo.
WAsH. L. ftv. 1114 (1970); Note, The Sierra Club, Political Activity, and Tax
Exempt Charitable Status, 55 GEo. LJ. 1128 (1967).
135 See notes 148-59 infra & accompanying text.
136 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958) (quoting American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).
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speech regulations that fail to provide "sensitive tools" for the pro-
tection of legitimate expression.'
37
Even as limited by the antilobbying cases, Speiser-and not
Cammarano-is the precedent relevant to an examination of the
Treasury Department's educational standard. Narrowly read,
Cammarano holds only that government may constitutionally dis-
tribute tax benefits on the basis of an ideologically neutral assess-
ment of the form of expression undertaken by a taxpayer. Speiser,
meanwhile, protects against impermissible distinctions among tax-
payers on the basis of the content of their expression. Although
the Treasury regulation challenged by BMR, Inc. does not itself
single out any particular ideology for differential treatment, it
leaves to individual officials the discretion to do precisely that. The
regulation is thus exactly the kind of blunt instrument the Speiser
Court deplored. Its inadequacy in guiding and controlling IRS
decisionmaking was explored in earlier sections of this Comment.
138
Of special relevance here are uses of the regulation clearly intended
to suppress "dangerous ideas." BMR, Inc. experienced one such
attempt when officials suggested that the organization modify its
support of homosexuals to conform with IRS "unwritten policy." 139
Further indication that the IRS may be led to ideological dis-
crimination appears in National Alliance v. United States,140 a
recently filed challenge to the "full and fair exposition" standard.
The plaintiff in that case is a nonprofit Virginia corporation that
publishes the newspaper Attack! and distributes other material to
promote Americans' "pride in their racial and cultural heritage." 141
National Alliance holds white-supremacist and anti-Semitic views 14
2
that place it in a position roughly equivalent to that of the 1950s
Communist: it is the target of general loathing. Not surprisingly,
the organization was denied tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3) for failure to substantiate the viewpoint it "advocates" by
137Id. 525.
138 See notes 47-101 supra & accompanying text.
'
3 9 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 10. See text accompanying note
23 supra.
140 No. 79-1885 (D.D.C., filed July 19, 1979).
'41 Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief, exhibit A,
National Alliance v. United States, No. 79-1885 (D.D.C., filed July 19, 1979)
(Articles of Incorporation of National Alliance) [hereinafter cited as National
Alliance Complaint].
142One issue of a National Alliance publication described its sentiments thus:
"(1) Non-White immigration must be halted and all non-Whites already present in
White countries must be removed, peaceably or otherwise; (2) the Jew must go,
totally and unconditionally:" National Alliance Bulletin, Sept., 1977, quoted in
National Alliance Complaint, supra note 141, at exhibit B, at 6 (letter of Mar. 31,
1978, from IRS District Director to National Alliance denying exemption).
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6a sufficiently full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts." 14
The IRS District Director's letter of denial contains a lengthy and
careful analysis of the applicant's publications. Nevertheless, cer-
tain slips indicate that the substance of plaintiff's views influenced
the decision. For example, among the reasons listed for denial is
the following: "Whereas the regulations Section 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(2)
specifically defines the term 'charitable' as including the elimination
of prejudice and discrimination and the defending of human and
civil rights secured by law, your publications advocate a contrary
policy." 144
It is, of course, unlikely that every IRS official envisions a
menacing image of subversion as he reviews section 501(c)(3) appli-
cations. Yet instances of ideological discrimination occur. 45 The
source of such problems is the educational standard itself, which
calls for more searching and subjective judgments than did the
andlobbying provisions upheld in Cammarano. The question
whether an organization has spoken publicly on a subject of legis-
lative activity will usually have a clear answer; 146 the same is not
true of the evaluation demanded by a standard that asks whether
the views expressed are "beneficial to the community" and sub-
stantiated by "full and fair exposition of the pertinent facts." 147
The discriminatory potential of such a standard, as well as the
examples of actual abuse, demonstrates the need for the vigilant
protection offered in Speiser v. Randall.
143 National Alliance Complaint, supra note 141, at exhibit B, at 8 (letter of
District Director).
144Id. This Comment does not intend to advocate tax-exempt status for
National Alliance. That case may contain issues beyond those strictly related to
freedom of expression. For example, National Alliance has a racially exclusionary
membership policy that could bring it within the prohibition of McGlotten v.
Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court) (tax exemption
of fraternal society with racially discriminatory membership policy is state action
violative of fifth amendment). For further discussion of denial of exempt status
to racially discriminatory organizations, see notes 153-54 & 157 infra accompanying
text. It should be noted, however, that the District Director's denial letter appears
far more concerned with National Alliance's publications than with its practices.
145For example, the IRS threatened to revoke the exemption of the Fellowship
of Reconciliation, a world pacifist organization, on the ground that the Fellowship
had abrogated the lobbying prohibition. The organization was permitted to keep
its exemption only after protest from Congress and the press. See Caplin &
Timbie, Legislative Activities of Public Charities, LAw & CoNTrEmp. P.Rons., Autumn,
1975, at 183, 187 (issue devoted to federal taxation and charitable organizations).
A comparable situation was described in Center on Corporate Responsibility v.
Shultz, 368 F. Supp. 863 (D.D.C. 1973), in which some evidence indicated that the
Center's exemption had been denied under pressure from the Nixon White House.
Id. 867. See also N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1976, § 4, at 4, col. 3.
146See Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii) (1959) (defining attempts to
,influence legislation).
147 Id. § 1.501(c) (3)-1(d) (3) (b).
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3. Tax-Exempt Status and the Survival of an Organization
The foregoing discussion does not suggest that every system of
government-granted benefits raises problems of constitutional di-
mension. Tax-exempt status under section 501(c)(3), however, is
not a benefit of marginal importance; it may be a crucial factor in
the survival of a nonprofit organization. In addition to removing
the obligation to pay federal income taxes, an exemption allows
qualified organizations to receive tax-deductible contributions. 14
Section 501(c)(3) status also facilitates receipt of grants from private
foundations. 149 Indeed, these sources of income may be more
critical to an exempt organization's survival than its relief from
taxation.150 In 1975, for example, charitable contributions and
private grants constituted over fifty percent of Big Mama Rag's
income. 151 National Alliance, too, claims to be dependent upon
private charity.152
The government itself recognizes that denial or revocation of
tax-exempt status may be a powerful inducement to conform to a
particular pattern of behavior. Consequently, tax exemption has
been used as a tool to further policy goals. This method of policy
implementation was approved in several cases, which upheld, for
example, denial of exempt status to racially segregated schools 11i
and to a fraternal order with a racially discriminatory member-
148 See I.R.C. § 170(c)(2) (permitting deduction of contributions only to
organizations that qualify under § 501(c) (3) ).
' 49 See I.R.C. § 4945(d) (5) (foundation's expenditures for purposes consonant
with §501(c)(3) not "taxable expenditures").
'
50 See B. HoPmNs, supra note 78, at 23; Sanden, What to Do About the Loss
of Exemption: Effect Upon the Organization and Its Members, 24 N.Y.U. INsT. ON
FED. TAX. 167 (1966). See also Alexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S.
752, 766 (1973) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
'51 See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 7.
3
52 See National Alliance Complaint, supra note 141, at 5-6.
The importance of tax-exempt status to organizations is underscored by the
notion of tax expenditures. One leading critic of the tax-exemption system, for
example, has compared tax exemptions to direct government expenditures. See
Surrey, supra note 99, at 713-15. Tax exemptions resemble expenditures in
creating revenue losses and in providing significant federal support through relief
from tax burdens. See Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of
1974, § (3)(a)(3), 31 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(3) (1976) (defining tax expenditures as
revenue losses). This concept has gained wide acceptance; in fact, Congress has
published an analysis of tax expenditures in addition to the ordinary direct appro-
priations budget. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALysEs,
BUDGET OF THE UNrED STATES GOvEBNMENT, FiscAL YEAR 1976, at 101, 108-09
(1975).
153 Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C.
1977); Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), affd mem. sub nom.
Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971).
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;.ship policy.15 Implicit in these decisions is the assumption that
tax exemptions constitute significant governmental support for an
-organization.155 Were this belief incorrect, the coercive use of
revocation or denial of exemptions would be a futile exercise. One
cannot implement public policy by withholding that which could be
,dispensed with. Thus, the IRS, in determining exempt status, does
.more than dole out federal largesse. It administers a financial
incentive that may be crucial enough to alter an organization's
-nature if the organization would rather change and survive than be
_principled and defunct.
56
The coercive use of tax policy is acceptable if its ultimate aim
is elimination of racial segregation. It is generally recognized that
the government may wield powerful tools in furtherance of that
goal. 57 A tax provision whose administration is so ill-regulated
that it permits the coercive weapon to be used against an organiza-
tion because it is "doctrinaire" may not be justified on equally
.clear policy grounds.
The nature of the organizations whose survival may be thrown
into doubt heightens the need for careful scrutiny of the Treasury
regulations. The groups likely to run afoul of the "full and fair"
standard are not those representing mainstream ideology.'58
Rather, they are those, like BMR, Inc. and National Alliance, that
espouse unpopular or radical analyses of American society. And
it is precisely these perspectives that most need first amendment
protection, for they encounter the greatest intolerance.159
B. The Void-for-Vagueness Analysis
The legal and practical background discussed above identify
the Treasury Department's educational exemption standard as an
254 McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge
,court) (exemption under I.R.C. §§ 501(c) (7) & 501(c) (8) for nonprofit clubs and
fraternal orders).
'55 Id. 456-57.
156 See Clark, supra note 134, at 450 (describing charitable organizations'
reactions to "crackdown" by IRS on charitable exemptions).
'5TSee, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Note, The Judicial
-Role in Attacking Racial Discrimination in Tax-Exempt Pfivate Schools, 93 H~Av.
L. REv. 378 (1979).
'158 For indications of the ERS's tendency to screen more leniently the ex-
,emption applications of noncontroversial organizations, see discussion of the
"advocacy" standard of Treas. Reg. §1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(b) (1959) at notes
.54-63 supra & accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theaters, 427 U.S. 50, 63-64 (1976);
,Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S.
1, 4 (1949); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
.concurring).
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apt candidate for strict constitutional scrutiny. The regulation has
a substantial capacity for and a recent history of ideologically dis-
criminatory abuse. Moreover, tax-exempt status is important
enough to nonprofit organizations that its denial may endanger
their capacity to advance their viewpoints. This threat seems more
than sufficient to trigger the arsenal of first amendment juris-
prudence.
Both BMR, Inc.160 and National Alliance 161 have advanced
various theories to support judicial invalidation of the regulation's
educational standard. This Comment will proceed to examine one
such theory: that the standard is void for vagueness. 16 2  A finding
of constitutional inadequacy in statutory language may compel
invalidation of that provision.1 3  As a means of attacking a per-
vasive evil, therefore, a vagueness challenge is preferable to the
kind of individual claim that might be resolved simply by ordering
relief for that plaintiff. Furthermore, because the vagueness doc-
trine aims at precisely those statutory and administrative defects
that mar the educational exemption regulation, it provides the most
comprehensive and telling analysis of that regulation's con-
stitutionality.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine has been used to invalidate
criminal statutes and administrative regulations; 1'4 it is regarded
as particularly appropriate in cases in which first amendment rights
may be at risk.es Among the noncriminal provisions struck down
16o See Brief of Appellant, supra note 3, at 31 (summarizing unconstitutional
condition, equal protection, and vagueness arguments).
161 National Alliance Complaint, supra note 141, at 4-5 (outlining arguments
regarding penalty on first amendment, unconstitutional condition, vagueness, and
equal protection).
162 BMR, Inc. argued vagueness in the district court. Judge Sirica dismissed
the issue with the conclusory remark that "[tihis standard is certainly capable of
objective application-it does not ask the IRS to determine whether the views
expressed are worthy or correct. Instead, it asks only whether the facts underlying
the conclusions are stated." Big Mama Rag, Inc. v. United States, 79-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. If 9362, at 86,873 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1979), appeal docketed, No. 79-1826
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 1979).
163 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967).
164 See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (dictum); Hannegan v.
Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (second-class mailing privileges may not be
conditioned on content of publication); Jacobs v. Board of School Comm'rs, 349
F. Supp. 604 (S.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 490 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1973), vacated as
moot, 420 U.S. 128 (1974) (overturning on vagueness and overbreadth grounds
public school publication regulations enforced by suspension and expulsion);
Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978 (W.D. Wis. 1968) ("misconduct" too vague
a basis for expulsion or suspension from university). But see Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077 (8th Cir. 1969) (school regulations not
subject to stringent standards of precision).
165 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959) (stricter standards of
precision required for speech-related statutes); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness
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on this theory are several that permitted ideological discrimination
by means of threats to withhold important government benefits.166
One example comes from the related area of nonprofit corporation
charters. The corporate charter, like the tax exemption, confers a
type of public status essential to the survival and operation of an
organization.1 7  In Association for the Preservation of Freedom of
Choice v. Shapiro,168 plaintiffs challenged denials of nonprofit cor-
poration charters. Under the state statute, judicial approval was
required before a charter could be granted. 169 A lower court judge,
in denying the applications, held that he had the responsibility to
determine whether the proposed corporation would be "in accord
with public policy and not injurious to the community." 170 The
New York Court of Appeals reversed because the tests enunciated
were "too vague, indefinite and elusive to serve as an objective
judicial standard. Within such a scope the individual Justice would
be at liberty to indulge in his own personal predilections .... , 17.
This case illustrates the appropriateness of the vagueness theory in
cases like Big Mama Rag.
The question of vagueness arises if application of a law requires
too much guesswork on the part of enforcing authorities or persons
subject to them. Uncertainty may result from statutory language
that is amenable to subjective interpretation. 172 It may also stem
from the presence of conflicting elements in the law itself. 73 Either
failing may engender two effects subversive of free expression. The
Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 60, 94 (1960) [hereinafter cited
as Vagueness Doctrine]. The Note focuses on criminal statutes but suggests that in
"noncriminal proceedings, . . .the seriousness of what is at stake . . .will be an
extremely significant variable . . . in the determination of whether a statute will
survive a vagueness attack." Id. 70 n.16.
166 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (state employment
withheld for "treasonable or seditious" utterance); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360
(1964) (vague loyalty oath required for state employment).
167 See Wilson & Shannon, Homosexual Organizations and the Right of
Association, 30 HAsr Ns LJ. 1029 (1979); 6 U. TOL. L. Rv. 237 (1974).
1689 N.Y.2d 376, 174 N.E.2d 487, 214 N.Y.S.2d 388 (1961).
169 Id. at 381, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 390.
.70 Id. at 380, 174 N.E.2d at 488, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 931.
171Id. at 382, 174 N.E.2d at 489, 214 N.Y.S.2d at 391. Although the court
thus suggests that first amendment values are implicated by denial of charters, it
does not appear to regard its vagueness analysis as constitutionally based.
This decision was cited with approval in Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo,
31 N.Y.2d 965, 293 N.E.2d 255, 341 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1973).
172See, e.g., Hynes v. Borough of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) ("recognized
cause"); Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) ("contemptuously");
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) ("treasonable or seditious");
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) ("good character").
173See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (related
civil and criminal statutes with conflicting definitions of "treasonable or seditious").
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first is the possibility of abuse of discretion by government officials
which, because of the murkiness of the standard, may go un-
checked. 7 4 The second is a "chilling effect"-would-be speakers
may forego constitutionally protected activities rather than risk the
penalty attendant upon unwitting violation of the vague legal
requirement1 7
5
The abuse-of-discretion problem is illustrated by Smith v.
Goguen.176 At issue before the Supreme Court was a Massachusetts
statute providing criminal penalties for one who "treats con-
temptuously" the American flag. A youth arrested under the statute
successfully raised the habeas corpus plea that the language was
unconstitutionally vague. During oral argument, the attorney for
the arresting sheriff admitted that if a war protestor had draped
himself in a flag for protection against a rainstorm, he would have
been arrested for contemptuous misuse, while an American Legion-
naire doing the same thing would have remained unmolested. 77
Keyishian v. Board of Regents178 explains the second danger-
the chilling effect. Under the statute invalidated there, a state
school employee could be dismissed for "treasonable or seditious"
utterances. The Supreme Court found that this standard had the
effect of inhibiting even academic consideration of radical political
doctrine; the line dividing protected discussion from punishable
incitement was far too ill-articulated to allow an instructor to teach
politics without fearing for his job. 179
The Treasury Department's definition of exempt educational
activity suffers from both of these defects and therefore fosters both
of the dangers outlined above. The operative language of the edu-
cational tests has been shown to be so broad and value-laden that it
not only permits, but encourages, subjective evaluation. The re-
viewing IRS agent is instructed to judge the value ("useful and
1
74 "A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen,
judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis." Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
175 See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964); Vagueness Doctrine, supra note 165, at 80. See
generally Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (chilling effect may be a consti-
tutional violation when "the challenged exercise of governmental power was
regulatory, proscriptive or compulsory in nature").
176415 U.S. 566 (1974).
177 Id. 575-76. See also Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969)
(vague parade permit ordinance used discriminatorily against civil-rights demon-
strators); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (clear pattern of discrim-
inatory abuse in issuance of park permits).
178385 U.S. 589 (1967).
179 Id. 601-02.
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beneficial"),8 0 the tenor ("advocates a particular position"),:8s and
the documentation ("full and fair") 182 of educational publications.
Vagueness also arises from the existence of two different standards
governing the level of advocacy permissible for exempt institutions.
The tax examiner's decision to apply the educational standard
rather than the charitable test is unguided by the regulation and is
essentially a matter of personal experience and discretion.
183
With such a foundation of imprecise language and internal
inconsistency, the instances of administrative abuse already dis-
cussed 84 should come as no surprise. Even absent malicious intent
to misuse his power, the IRS official may make inequitable decisions
because he has no guidance for fair determination. The regulation's
language may serve as the source of a chilling effect as well. Like
the instructors in Keyishian, organizations in need of tax-exempt
status may feel forced to tailor publications to satisfy the IRS. 8 5
If their editors perceive-correctly-that the IRS regards statistics or
"hard facts" as evidence of educational value, 8 6 they may, for fear
of losing exempt status, adopt a form of discussion inappropriate
to their concerns.
This analysis requires the conclusion that Treasury regulation
section 1.501(c)(3)-l(d)(3)(b) is void for vagueness. That result does
not, however, leave the exemption field without boundaries. The
present regulation furnishes a solution that can provide the IRS
agent with more precise guidelines and offer the applicant a less
restrictive examination of its publications. That solution is the
subject of the following part.
IV. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The concern of first amendment inquiry is to allow the freest
possible expression, without impairment of countervailing interests.
When first amendment values are at stake, it has long been held that
regulations tending to restrict them must be worded carefully in
order to allow expression "breathing space to survive." 187 Financial
180 See notes 47-53 supra & accompanying text.
181 See notes 54-63 supra & accompanying text.
18 2 See notes 64-73 supra & accompanying text.
183 See notes 74-101 supra & accompanying text.
184 See note 145 supra.
185 See note 156 supra & accompanying text.
186 See notes 65-66 supra & accompanying text.
18 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (quoting
N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963)).
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security through tax-exempt status is a significant determinant of a
nonprofit organization's "breathing space." The Treasury regula-
tion governing decisions about tax exemptions should therefore be
drafted to provide the least possible opportunity for arbitrary assess-
ment of the content of an organization's views.
The least intrusive means of regulating tax exemptions of edu-
cational organizations has already been provided by the IRS. It is
the relatively content-free standard of Treasury regulation section
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(2), "Charitable defined." Under this standard, an
IRS official need only determine whether an organization has en-
gaged in lobbying and campaign activities and whether its business
practices meet the organizational and operational tests of section
1.501(c)(3)-1(a) to (c). These tests are capable of much more
objective application and are more closely related to the revenue
collection function and expertise of the IRS than is a test of edu-
cational content. 88
Elimination of the "full and fair" standard might be prob-
lematic if the categories of educational and charitable organizations
were completely distinct. Fortunately, however, they are not.
Treating education as a subset of charity would not depart from
accepted legal doctrine nor from the language of the Treasury
regulation. 8 9
Moreover, it is unlikely that any significant countervailing
interests would be abridged by denying the IRS the authority to
evaluate educational content. Even assuming that the present regu-
lation is based upon some legitimate government interest in regulat-
ing the content of educational organizations receiving its imprima-
tur, this Comment has suggested that the safeguarding of that
interest should not be left to the ad hoc decisionmaking of IRS
officials. And the assumption of the existence of some legitimate
governmental interest is of questionable validity. In fact, judicial
decisions that have upheld denials of tax exemptions have not had
to address disputed IRS judgments of the content of publications. 190
This case law has even led two commentators to assert, erroneously,
that content is irrelevant to decisions on applications for educa-
tional exemptions. 191 Courts have denied exemptions on the basis
' 88 See notes 72-73 & 99 supra & accompanying text.
189 See notes 83-92 supra & accompanying text.
190 Cf. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (no dispute re-
garding nature of the speech in which plaintiff had engaged).
191 Rainey & Henshaw, supra note 4, at 215.
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of an applicant organization's lobbying activities ' 92 or its failure to
meet the exclusivity provision of the organizational and operational
tests' 9 3 and, occasionally, on the special policy ground that racist
activities may not be furthered with federal support.' M These tests
would still be available, even without the educational standard, to
protect whatever interests were upheld in those cases.195 The exist-
ence of the educational standard creates an unnecessary additional
restriction-one almost never used except in cases, like Big Mama
Rag and National Alliance, that raise questions of discrimination.
Retention of the "full and fair" standard is not justified by
fiscal considerations either. It is doubtful that the increase in
exemptions resulting from relaxation of the standard of review
would have a severe, if even a noticeable, effect on the public fisc.
The reform suggested here would not substantially increase the
number of exemptions: the majority of educational organizations,
such as schools and libraries, are clearly within the definition of
"educational" and thus exempt under the present restrictive
standard. The organizations that would benefit from a more liberal
definition would be the small and unorthodox ones, such as Big
Mama Rag.
The charitable exemption already accounts for a revenue loss
of approximately two billion dollars,196 the educational exemption,
one of only approximately one hundred and seventy million19 7
Any additional revenue cost would result from loss of direct tax
1
92 Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Christian Echoes
Nat'l Ministry v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972); League of Women
Voters v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960); cf. Cammarano v.
United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (lobbying expenses not "ordinary and necessary"
business expense under I.R.C. §23(a)(1)(A)).
193 American Inst. for Econ. Research v. United States, 302 F.2d 934 (Ct. Cl.
1962); Fides Publishers Ass'n v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 924 (N.D. Ind.
1967).
194 Goldsboro Christian Schools v. United States, 436 F. Supp. 1314 (E.D.N.C.
1977); McGlotten v. Connally, 338 F. Supp. 448 (D.D.C. 1972); Green v.
Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150 (D.D.C.), aff'd mem. sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404
U.S. 997 (1971).
195 Indeed, several commentators have suggested that the "full and fair"
language should be read in the context of the lobbying prohibition. That is, the
standard may have been promulgated initially as a means of determining whether
organizations were attempting to influence legislation. See B. HoPxNs, supra
note 78, at 131; P. Tnuuscu & N. SuAmN, supra note 94, at 106; Jordan, s.upra
note 100, at 14; see also Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133, 1143-44 (Ct. Cl.
1974). The test for the breach of that provision should be objective, relying, for
example, on the existence of contacts with legislators or contributions to political
campaigns. For discussion of cases involving antilobbying provisions, see notes
122-33 supra & accompanying text.
19 6 See Surrey, supra note 99, at 709.
197 Id.
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revenue from the organization or loss of personal income tax due
to charitable deductions. The first would most likely be minimal-
these organizations are nonprofit and therefore, by current account-
ing definitions, have no taxable income. 98 The second loss is
impossible to estimate. Would-be contributors to these unorthodox
organizations probably do not at present account for a major con-
centration of tax revenue. This seemingly negligible effect on tax
revenues should not be allowed to weigh heavily against the interest
of assuring the least intrusive means of regulating expression. 199
This Comment has examined-and found wanting-one element
of the tax-exemption machinery. The broad language and double
standards of the charitable/educational regulations engender, at
best, confusion and, at worst, discrimination against controversial
publications like Big Mama Rag. First amendment vagueness
theory may be employed to analyze and extirpate the offending
language. Without a change such as that recommended here, the
"full and fair" regulation remains a source of the fear cogently
articulated by Mr. Justice Blackmun:
[W]here the philanthropic organization is concerned, there
appears to be little to circumscribe the almost unfettered
power of the Commissioner. This may be very well so
long as one subscribes to the particular brand of social
policy the Commissioner happens to be advocating at the
time . . . , but application of our tax laws should not
operate in so fickle a fashion.200
19 8 See Bittker & Rahdert, supra note 78, at 307-28.
199 Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261 (1970) (state interest in public
tax revenue insufficient to justify suspension of welfare funds without prior hearing);
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969) (state interest in limiting welfare
expenditures insuffcient to justify durational residency requirement for welfare
eligibility, which restricts right to travel).
Any loss in tax revenues might be partially offset by a savings in administrative
costs because the suggested reform, by avoiding thorny definitional questions and
scrutiny of content, would probably be more easily implemented.
200 AJexander v. "Americans United" Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 774-75 (1974)
<Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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